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ABSTRACT
The patent regime is a quintessential notice
system. Implicit in its design is the concept that
one attempting to license a patent can identify
those who hold the requisite rights and the
territory that the patent holders claim. The
modern
system,
however,
bears
little
resemblance to the idealized form.
In the last decade, an entire Hobbit’s world has
been created under the foliage with little
information available to inform the market. To
address the problem, this Article suggests
borrowing from doctrines related to disclosure in
the realm of corporate securities, molding those
doctrines to particular patent concerns.
As a government grant, bestowed for
constitutional purposes, a patent is an asset
imbued with the public interest. Analogous to the
trading of public securities, the trading of patent
assets must be sufficiently transparent to ensure
proper functioning of that trading market.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States patent system in recent years has
strayed far from the ideal reflected in its initial design. Crafted
according to consequentialist notions of promoting the progress
of the useful arts and utilitarian notions of maximizing that
good, the patent system is quintessentially a notice system.
Society provides strict liability for making, using, or selling a
patented invention, in anticipation that all those who wish to do
so are on notice by virtue of the grant and publication of the
patent. Implicit in the patent system’s structure is the concept
that one attempting to license a patent can identify those who
hold the requisite rights, as well as being able to identify the
territory that the patent holders claim as their own.
In the quaint image embodied in the system’s design,
one who wishes to manufacture a product can peruse the U.S.
Patent & Trademark Office’s (PTO) files of active patents,
identify any rights that might be implicated by the creation of
the product, and appear on the patent holder’s doorstep, hat in
hand. One is not guaranteed a license—withholding a patent is
the patent holder’s prerogative, and the modern Patent Act
underscores this latitude by specifying that failure to work the
patent does not constitute patent misuse. Nevertheless,
participants in the process are not expected to dance in the
dark.
As the system has evolved, however, it bears little
resemblance to the idealized form. Scholars have identified
systemic problems that prevent the system from realizing the
ideal represented in its design. In particular, numerous scholars
have written about flaws in the notice system that are
attributable to the vast number of active patents and the lack of
predictability in decision-making by federal circuit courts. In
addition, this author has written from a theoretical perspective
about the impossibility of predicting ex ante the scope of any
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particular patent, given the lack of a societally shared
conception for things that are new, the difficulties inherent in
language, and the impossibility of anticipating those yet
uncreated inventions to which the patent language will be
compared during the life of the patent.1
Only recently, however, have scholars begun to address
problems related to transparency of ownership within the
modern patent system, largely because these problems have
sprung up so recently.2 In particular, over the last five-to-seven
years, an entire Hobbit’s world has been created under the
foliage, a world in which sunshine rarely penetrates.
The notion of transparency could include a wide variety
of information, from licenses granted to valuation information.
All such information arguably could promote more efficient
bargaining in the market for patent monetization. This Article,
however, focuses on one, limited aspect of transparency—that
is, information related to those who have a financial interest in
the patent. Identifying those interests can provide a small, but
essential, step in ensuring the communication of sufficient
knowledge for the players in the field.
Even this limited idea is not without controversy. In
opposition to notions of transparency, one aggregator has
argued that even basic ownership structure should be private—
let alone information about beneficial interests. At an
FTC/DOJ Workshop on patent assertion entities in 2012, a

1

See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 13–23 (2012).
For interesting explorations of transparency and modern ownership issues,
see JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE (2008); Mark
Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 257 (2008); Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure &
Notice Externalities, 5 J.L. ANALYSIS 1 (2013); Michael Risch, Patent
Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89 (2013).
2
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representative of aggregator Intellectual Ventures argued the
following:

We spend a lot of money and a lot of effort
figuring out where to invest. And we don’t feel
like tipping our hands on our investment
policies and our investment intentions to our
competitors. Warren Buffett doesn’t tell people
where he’s investing until he’s forced to when
he’s practically ready to take over a company.
Disney doesn’t tell people when it[’]s buying
swamp land in Florida that, hey, we’re planning
to put a theme park over there.3
It is certainly true that secrecy in business transactions
can have tremendous value for those who hold information that
others in the market do not have. The question, of course,
concerns the societal costs and benefits. The modern
conception of a properly competitive market looks to the
benefits for competition as a whole, not to the benefits for
individual competitors. In a competitive environment,
economists generally believe that information is a positive
attribute and information asymmetries lead to market
imperfections and distortions.
As trading in patents develops into a more sophisticated
and fluid market, society should think carefully about how that
market functions. This is particularly appropriate in the case of

3

Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Just., Patent Assertion Entity
Activities Workshop Transcript 62–63 (Dec. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/Patent%20A
ssertion%20Entity%20Activities%20Workshop%20/pae_transcript.pdf.
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patents, which are government-granted grants. One would be
hard pressed to argue that society should tailor a system of
government grants in a way that encourages information
asymmetries.
In addition to the notion of properly functioning
markets, the information asymmetries implicated in the Walt
Disney analogy are particularly problematic for a system
intended to create incentives for inventors. As a Justice
Department staff member noted, the Disney analogy implies
that in the current environment, unsuspecting inventors will be
under-compensated.4 Processes that take advantage of and dupe
the small inventor are hardly consistent with the goals of the
patent system.5 In short, from a societal perspective, stealth is
not valuable to the patent system. Rather, stealth plays much to
its detriment.
This Article considers in depth the problem of
transparency as a general matter and transparency of ownership
in particular in modern patent law. Part II provides background
on the patent system, from both a theoretical and a descriptive
perspective, highlighting the patent system’s animating logic
and the potential gaps between that logic and the system’s
design. Part III describes the fact that scholarly discussions of
notice concerns have focused largely on governmental actors
and their role in ensuring that a patent can be properly
understood and interpreted. In contrast, this Part argues that
market information is an important element of the notice
function of patents. One can think of the mechanisms for
providing that market information broadly as “Transparency.”

4
5

Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
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To address transparency insufficiency, one need not
write on a blank slate. Part IV suggests a framework adapted
from disclosure in the realm of corporate securities. In
particular, this Article suggests borrowing from the substantial
body of well-developed doctrine and literature associated with
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, which is used for
disclosure of interests in corporate securities. Part IV then
explores the way in which these doctrines could be molded to
the concerns in patent law.
Application of corporate securities disclosure law to
patents is particularly appropriate in light of the analogous
public interest. The public interest in securities disclosure rests
with the publicly traded nature of the organization and
society’s interest in a fair and optimally functioning stock
market.
With patents, the asset itself is imbued with public
interest by virtue of the fact that a patent is a government grant,
bestowed only for purposes enshrined in the Constitution itself.
As with the trading of public securities, the trading of an asset
imbued with the public interest must be sufficiently regulated
to ensure proper functioning of that trading market.
II.

WHY TRANSPARENCY IN GENERAL?

One must begin by asking whether any form of
transparency is a useful or necessary element for the patent
system. Businesses frequently prefer not to disclose
information, and there are certainly circumstances in which
society erects barriers to protect commercial silence,
particularly within the realm of intellectual property. For
example, patent’s sister regime, trade secret, is entirely
premised on the value of commercial secrecy, and the
accompanying doctrines are dedicated to protecting that
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silence. Copyright also has aspects of tolerating and even
protecting
non-communication.
For
example,
uncommunicated writings can receive even greater protections in
copyright than those that are published. Moreover, the modern
copyright system no longer requires any semblance of notice or
publication, having abolished both notice and deposit
requirements in the 1980s.6 In other words, one need not make
certain that the world has access to one’s original writings in
order to protect those writings under copyright.
In contrast to trade secret and copyright, however, the
patent system traditionally has emphasized values such as
notice, openness, and disclosure—areas that are related to
transparency. In order to develop a deeper exploration of what
transparency is and what aspects might be desirable for patents,
this Article begins by looking at the theoretical concepts
underlying the patent system.
In the historic, theoretical framework of the American
patent system, patents are a limited government grant. From
the store of those things that might otherwise be available to
all, society dedicates a portion to the province of the few, in
hopes that the benefit will redound to society as a whole.7 The
portions dedicated are limited in both time and scope, with the
footprint of the patent restricted to the incremental contribution
that the patent holder has made to society.
One could construct a theoretical framework for
intellectual property rights based on the natural or inherent

6

S. REP. NO. 100-352 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706.
Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
250, 252–53 (2013). These benefits include, among others, promoting
innovation, encouraging the production of quality goods, and maintaining
an appropriately functioning marketplace.
7
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rights of the inventor. Similar frames can found in scattered
pre-constitutional colonial history, as well as in certain corners
of modern intellectual property rights of foreign nations. From
at least the moment that intellectual property was enshrined in
constitutional language, however, the American system of
intellectual property in general, and patents in particular, has
been decidedly utilitarian.8 According to this framework,
society grants time-limited rights for the specific purpose of
bringing about a particular societal consequence. In the case of
patents, of course, that consequence is described as promoting
the progress of the “useful [a]rts.”9
This consequence-based approach is critical for
understanding the patent system. Although some popular
commentary may wax poetic on the rights of the valiant
inventor, the system is designed with larger societal goals in
mind.
In pursuit of these goals, the patent regime is a
communicative system, an approach evident throughout its
language and design. Even the vernacular of patent law exudes
its communicative function. In discussing a particular patent,
for example, one speaks in terms of what the patent “teaches,”
and one asks whether the patent “reads on” a particular accused
device.

8

For a detailed explanation of consequentialist versus rights-based
jurisprudence and a description of how these concepts play out in the
American patent system, see FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 76–78. See also
Robin Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the Theory of General and
Individual Taxation, 21 VA. TAX REV. 293 (2002) (explaining
consequentialism and nonconsequentialism in the context of the
philosophical roots of modern tax theory); Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What
Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patent? Reevaluating the Patent
“Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007).
9
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
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The design of the patent regime evidences the system’s
communicative function. The powerful patent right is granted
only in exchange for revealing to society the details of one’s
innovation, details that will be free for all to use at the
conclusion of the patent term. Tremendous judicial and
jurisprudential energy is devoted to the question of ensuring
that sufficient information is disclosed to justify granting patent
protection to the inventor. In addition, the patent regime is
quintessentially a notice system. As with its evolutionary
ancestor, real property, the patent system is designed to provide
notice to all of the boundaries of what is claimed in any
particular patent. In fact, notice is considered so critical to the
patent system that the government itself undertakes the
responsibility of providing notice to the public of the patent
territory that it has granted and the person to whom that
territory was granted. Loosely similar to the modern recording
system for land, the federal government in the form of the PTO
publicizes the full text of the patent itself, as well as any
written history of negotiations between the patent holder and
the government examiners—a history that may be relevant in
identifying territory that the patent holder tried and failed to
secure.
The terms “evolutionary ancestor” and “loosely
similar” are used with great care in this Article to describe the
relationship between patents and land. Although the patent
system may indeed trace its lineage back to the system of real
property, the modern patent system bears no more resemblance
to land than modern humans resemble chimpanzees. They are
simply different beasts.
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The distinction can be understood in reductionist form
as the following:10 with land, society has some shared
conception of what it is that one is trying to define, even if that
conception is imperfect or incomplete at times. Patents,
however, are granted on things that are new, and there are
serious limitations in forming shared societal conceptions of
things that are truly new. Worse yet, whatever language one
chooses for the patent granted to the thing that is new, that
language must be compared repeatedly to other products that
did not exist when the patent was granted. Land does not suffer
from this continual upheaval, and it is this perpetual unfolding
of meaning that distinguishes the patent system sharply from
systems related to land.
Nevertheless, the patent system is predicated on notice,
and it applies a form of strict liability to those who would
trespass. One who makes, uses, or sells a patented product, or a
product embodying a patented process, is liable for patent
infringement, regardless of whether the infringer independently
invented it or had any direct knowledge of the patented
invention. The patent system itself is intended to provide
sufficient notice, a heavy responsibility given the potential
consequences of violating someone’s patent.11

10

For an extensive theoretical and descriptive discussion of why patents are
not like real property, see FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 9–13, 211–12. The
discussion of differences between patents and land is distinct from modern
debates about whether the remedies in the patent system and whether these
should follow so-called property rules or liability rules. See, e.g., Andrew
Beckerman-Rodau, Patents are Property: A Fundamental but Important
Concept, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87 (2009) (a shift to liability remedies in lieu
of property remedies for patent infringement is unjustified).
11
Infringers may be liable for damages or an injunction. A spate of large
patent infringement awards demonstrates the potential cost of infringement.
Having one’s product enjoined can be even costlier for a company.
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One could argue that the communicative function
evident in patent law extends only to information about the
scope of the patent. From this perspective, the patent would
simply be a warning to “stay away,” and information on
ownership would be irrelevant. This would, however, paint an
odd economic picture in which a single inventor with a single
patent moves forward in a solitary fashion to create a product
requiring only that patent. The patent system is neither
designed nor does it operate in this manner, and it would be
economically irrational, if it did. Rather, trading and licensing
historically has played an important role in the patent system,
as patent holders seek out and find others who would
commercialize their ideas in combination with the other rights
necessary to create a viable product. Among other things, the
patent system does not mandate vertical integration, a
requirement that would be anathema to most modern
economists. The following Parts examine the functioning of the
modern patent system, exploring the ways in which ownership
information contributes to the communicative and notice
functions of the patent system.

III.

PATENT OWNERSHIP & THE ROLE OF MARKET
INFORMATION

Numerous commentators have written on the problem
of notice failure within the patent system. For example, a 2013
governmental report, which cited scholars Bessen and Meurer,
noted the following:
In an optimal patent regime, patent property
rights are clearly defined and easily determined
so the world is on notice as to their existence,
scope, and ownership. This “notice function”
enables people to avoid infringement, negotiate
permission to use others’ IP, and maximize
Vol. 19
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efficiency, such as by not keeping all inventions
as trade secrets or doing R&D on inventions
already
claimed
by
someone
else.12
The report then notes that the notice system has
particularly broken down in the information technology sector,
given that claims have “fuzzy boundaries” and it is
economically infeasible or irrational for parties to search
through existing patents to avoid infringement.13
Many scholars and commentators have described the
vast and increasing number of active patents combined with the
lack of predictability in judicial interpretation of patents.14 To

12

BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
“PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 1 (2013).
13
See id; see also FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 52–53; Jeanne C. Fromer,
Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 721 (2009); Michael
Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 179 (2007).
14
See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful
Claim Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 177 (2005) (arguing
that “[c]laim construction jurisprudence is in disarray” and noting that “the
Federal Circuit reverses trial court claim construction decisions at a
worryingly high rate”); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is
Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 231
(2005) (documenting a “concern among the bench and bar that the Federal
Circuit’s de novo review of district court claim construction decisions and
lack of guidance have caused considerable unpredictability”); see also
Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 340 (2005) (discussing claims that the Federal Circuit
engages in “erratic and unpredictable decision-making”); Jeffrey A. Lefstin,
The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at
the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1027, 1094 (2007) (arguing
that despite the nearly seamless consensus of problems related to de novo
review of patent claim construction, it is “the indeterminacy of patent law,
rather than the application of patent law by the district courts or the Federal
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put it simply, there are millions of patents outstanding, and it is
difficult to know how any particular court will interpret each
one. Considering that patents may have dozens of claims, and
that a patent suit could rely on only one of the claims, the
problem multiplies.
The difficulties may be more pronounced in some
industries than in others, depending on the number of patents
necessary to produce a typical product. Estimates suggest that
300,000 patents may be relevant to the average smartphone, far
more than the number of patents relevant to a drug derived
from a single chemical formula. Even for biopharmaceuticals,
however, one must consider more than the patent on the single
chemical formulation. Relevant patents could include those
related to methods of manufacturing the drug in a form that is
stable and can be mass produced, dosage forms, methods of
treatment, screening methods used to identify the drug and its
treatment methods, and other ancillary technologies.15
Scholarly works concerning notice failure in patents
tend to focus on governmental actors and their role in ensuring
that the scope of a patent can be properly identified. In
particular, proposed doctrinal solutions have centered on Patent

Circuit’s review of the district courts,” that “is responsible for the current
circumstances of patent litigation”); John R. Thomas, Claim ReConstruction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 87 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y	
   781, 792–93 (2005) (discussing
unpredictable judicial claim construction in the Federal Circuit); R. Polk
Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105,
1179 (2004) (concluding that whether the Federal Circuit is succeeding is
an open question).
15
See Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price, Patent Trolling—Why Bio &
Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk (U.C. Hastings Research Paper No. 93, 2014),
at 28–38, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2395987.
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& Trademark Office regulations regarding how a patent must
be drafted and what types of patents should be approved, as
well as judicial doctrines and procedures to ensure more
predictable interpretation at the Federal Circuit level and at the
trial courts.16 These are important considerations for enhancing
the notice function of the patent system. One must also
understand, however, the role that basic market information
plays in ensuring a properly functioning patent system.17
As noted in the author’s prior works, one tends to think
of the moment of granting a patent as the moment in which a
definitive definition is fixed.18 From that perspective, a judge’s
role is to properly understand and interpret that definition.
Meaning is contextual, however, and one cannot develop a
complete understanding of the meaning of something without
the full context of all those things that might or might not be
included in the meaning. Whatever language one chose to
describe the invention in a patent, that language must be
compared to products and innovations that did not exist at the
time of the patent grant. The inquiries the courts make will be
guided by the serendipity of the products that emerge, with
certain developments leading the courts to flesh out particular
contours of the definition that would otherwise remain
unexplored. This question and answer process ultimately
results in a bounded set of rights, but one cannot know that
bounded set of rights until the end of the twenty-year patent
term, when all of the potential products have appeared and all

16

For an excellent description of the problems of lack of transparency in the
modern patent system, including the problems that lack of market
information can provide, see Proposed Changes to Require Identification of
Attributable Owner, 79 Fed. Reg. 4105 (Jan. 24, 2014) [hereinafter
Proposed Changes].
17
See Risch, supra note 2.
18
For an extensive exploration of the concepts touched upon in this
paragraph, see FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 17–20.
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of the questions that will be asked during that time have been
asked. In other words, one cannot possibly know all of the
contours of the definition of a patent, although certain doctrinal
rules and structures will provide more efficiency in the
development of that definition and in cabining the bargaining
that occurs along the way.
In this context, the actions of market participants will
be critical for all parties trying to understand how a particular
patent and its definition may be unfolding in the marketplace.
The static information of the patent itself will never be
sufficient. This is not to suggest that market forces should have
the power to determine the boundaries of a patent. The territory
that a patent holder asserts, and the fact that others acquiesce to
that assertion by taking licenses, may represent no more than
the relative power of those who hold the patent. It may also
reflect the odd economics of current patent litigation, in which
a patent holder can impose large costs and risks on those who
are currently making a product, without incurring much cost or
risk itself.19
For example, a patent holder can file suit alleging
infringement of a particular patent without specifying much
more. This can impose a series of costs on the target company,
which must try to analyze all of the claims in the patent, and all
of its own products and activities, to look for any plausible
reason for the allegation. Moreover, the cost to challenge a
single patent in court can range from $600,000 to $6 million,

19

For an excellent presentation of the economics of modern patent
litigation, particularly as applied to patent monetization, see Colleen Chien,
Patent
Assertion
Entities
(2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (presentation
to the DOJ/FTC Hearing on PAEs); see also Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl
Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2288911.
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with the amount increasing in cases of multiple patents or large
portfolios. As a result, a patent holder can launch an attack on a
target for a minimal expenditure, offering to settle below what
it would cost the target to challenge the demand, or in some
cases below what it would cost to fully analyze the demand.
These economic realities may encourage target companies to
settle, regardless of whether the patent is valid or validly
asserted against them.
For example, one technology company described the
process pointedly in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court on
the issue of awarding fees.20 The company noted that it has
rarely lost a case brought by monetization entities, but that it
has been forced to bear the legal costs:
This reality is the lifeblood of the patent
assertion industry. . . . Indeed, the opening line of many
negotiations is some form of, “What we’re asking for is
less than it will cost you to litigate this case to
judgment.” It should come as no surprise, then, that
despite its success in litigating the merits, for business
purposes [our company] has agreed to a settlement in
51 of the 57 closed cases.21
In light of these patent litigation factors, the actions of
market participants should not be relied upon to determine the
proper boundaries of a patent. Nevertheless, such activity can
provide important signaling information about how the market
is unfolding and the territory claimed.

20

Brief for Apple Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U. S. ____
(2014) (No. 12-1163), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v3/12-1163-121184_np_amcu_apple.authcheckdam.pdf.
21
See id.	
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A focus on market information is particularly important
at this stage in the evolution of the patent system. Although the
licensing and trading of patent rights unrelated to product
development is not new,22 the scope and scale of such modern
activities are unusual. Large numbers of patents that would not
have garnered a return in the past are being separated out from
any underlying product and transferred in the form of
commoditized, tradable rights.23 New types of large and
complex entities have appeared on the scene, including mass
aggregators and various forms of patent clubs. In addition, as
the market for patent monetization has accelerated, variations
on the theme have emerged, including product companies who
enter the monetization market by creating monetization
subsidiaries, transferring assets to third parties, or joining
various patent buying clubs.24 Even universities have signaled
their interest in entering the fray, with the Association of
University Technology Managers announcing its intent to

22

See Naomi R. Lamoreaux, et al., Patent Alchemy: The Market for
Technology in US History, 87 BUS. HIST. REV. 3, 21 (2013) (documenting
attorneys who served as patent brokers in the nineteenth century); Gerard N.
Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809 (2007) (quoting Sen. Isaac
Christiancy, 8 Cong. Reg. 307 (1878) for a colorful description of patent
sharks).
23
For a detailed description of the emergence of the modern market for
patent monetization and the forms of entities that have emerged, see
Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 7, at 264–68. See also
Sara Jeruss, et al., The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities on U.S. Litigation, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. J. 357 (2012);
Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1 (2012).	
  
24
For an in-depth analysis of different types of patent trolling entities, see
Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2012).
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consider policies in support of transferring rights to
monetization entities.25
As the market for patent monetization develops and
expands, scholars and lawmakers must think of it in classic
market terms. This includes, of course, ensuring the flow of
information necessary to establish an efficiently functioning
market. It is an ideal that remains far in the distance.
A. Notice Failure: A Lack of Market Information
As described above, in an optimal patent system, the
world is on notice of the existence, scope and ownership of a
patent. This information allows participants to avoid
infringement, negotiate permission, and maximize innovation
efficiency.26 The modern patent system, however, bears little
resemblance to this ideal, even with information as basic as
patent ownership.
For example, although initial ownership must be noted
for the PTO when one files a patent, transfers of ownership are
not always recorded. For example, in prior work tracing the
thousands of shell companies established by a large patent
aggregator, this author and a co-author noted examples in
which patent holders announced a sale to the aggregator but
there was no change in ownership recorded at the PTO for
many years.

25

See Paul Baskin, Under Financial Pressure, Universities Give Patent
Buyers a Closer Look, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Oct. 25, 2013); see
also Heidi Ledford, Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, NATURE
(Sept. 24, 2013) (documenting examples of federally funded university
patents that have been transferred to patent monetization entities).
26
See sources cited supra note 12.	
  
Vol. 19

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY

No. 01

2

Feldman, Transparency

2014

291

Even when formal ownership is properly recorded, such
information represents the tip of the iceberg if one wants to
understand who has the right to assert the patent—let alone
how it has been asserted. Patent owners can transfer rights
sufficient to assert a patent short of formally transferring
ownership. For example, a university could grant an exclusive
license to an entity. If worded properly, that license would give
the entity not only the right to develop a product from the
patent, but also the right to assert the patent against others. The
exclusive license would not show up anywhere because
licensing information is not recorded at the PTO, regardless of
whether the license is exclusive or sufficient to allow assertion.
Ownership information can fall short in other ways as
well. Suppose ownership is recorded at the PTO in the name of
a parent company; the parent company has a number of
subsidiaries, each of which holds a license to the patent. If a
small business has paid for a license from the first subsidiary
and is approached by the second subsidiary, it may be difficult
for the small business to know that the subsidiaries are related;
it may already hold a sufficient license.
Ownership information can be critical not just for
licensing but also for challenging a patent. In this context, the
complex structures of modern patent monetizers can be
particularly difficult to penetrate. Consider the largest patent
aggregator, Intellectual Ventures. With estimated holdings of
30,000–60,000 patents worldwide, Intellectual Ventures has
the fifth-largest patent portfolio of any domestic U.S. company
and the fifteenth largest of any company in the world.27
Working painstakingly from public sources, one can
identify more than 1,200 subsidiaries associated with

27

Ewing & Feldman, supra note 23, at 25–35.
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Intellectual Ventures.28 These subsidiaries exist in obscure
networks with the “parent” company, following structures
permitted by the corporate laws in many states. In prior work,
this author has described the complex ownership structure of
one of the subsidiaries, whose organization is typical of the
structures of modern mass aggregators.29
The layers of shell companies can make it difficult for
those who receive patent demands to challenge the validity of
the underlying patents or the appropriateness of the demand
against them. Consider the Xilinx v. Invention Investment Fund
I LP case.30 Xilinx filed a declaratory judgment action
challenging some of the patents asserted against it.31 The judge
dismissed some of the parties that Xilinx named on the grounds
that the patent owners were really seven other shell companies
associated with the aggregator, rather than the ones Xilinx had
named. In other words, Xilinx could not even tell who was
asserting the patents against it so that it could sufficiently
challenge those patents.

28

See id.
“Searete LLC, a fairly well-known Intellectual Ventures shell company
that exemplifies the complicated ownership and management structures
employed by mass aggregators. Searete has the type of complex and
carefully woven legal structure that would make a defense lawyer beam
with joy. It is a Delaware limited liability company with a presence in
Nevada. Searete’s official manager in Nevada is ‘Nevada Licensing
Manager, LLC,’ which is a Nevada corporation. Nevada Licensing
Manager’s own manager is ‘Nevada Assets, LLC,’ which is a Delaware
company. At some point, Nevada Assets, LLC presumably connects with
Intellectual Ventures, LLC or one of Intellectual Ventures’ many
investment funds. However, the connection might be little more than the
ownership of shares, effectively rendering almost no one responsible for its
actions.” See id. at 38 (footnotes omitted).
30
Id. at 39–40 (citing No. 11-CV-0671 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 14, 2011)).
31
Id.
29
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Although Intellectual Ventures is a mass aggregator
with tens of thousands of patents, one can see similar
structuring strategies at work with an example of a small
player, MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC. Working with
just five patents, the company created more than 100
subsidiaries to assert those patents, sending thousands of letters
to small businesses. Some of the small businesses received
letters from more than one subsidiary across time. When the
target is a small player with little knowledge of the patent
system and patent licensing, this type of approach can result in
multiple payments to what is essentially the same entity.
To the extent it is difficult for a party accused of
infringement to find information, the difficulty for those trying
to understand if they might need to enter into a licensing
arrangement and for whom to approach is even greater. As
described above, one cannot rely on publicly recorded
information at the PTO, in the way that one can rely on
recorded land ownership. Market information is limited as
well. Licenses and settlements by patent assertion entities are
typically shrouded in strict nondisclosure agreements, which
prevent the parties from revealing anything about the
interaction. This secrecy blocks information from filtering into
the market that would allow others to understand who is
asserting the patent and what territory is being claimed.
One might think that information would improve once a
lawsuit is filed, given that lawsuits are a matter of public
record. Although some information becomes available, the
information is limited and not easily accessible. As a starting
point, many monetization entities are organized as limited
liability companies, with the result that information on related
entities may be limited. Moreover, judges are frequently
willing to seal documents, an action that has the effect of
limiting the information that does arise. In fact, much of the
information that is now available from the Xilinx case
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mentioned above was originally sealed by a judge, who later
chose to recuse herself from the case.32 The information was
only released when a subsequent judge chose to grant the
motion to make the information public.
Information that does appear in litigation may be
difficult for the public to access—even basic information such
as whether a patent has been asserted in a lawsuit. In theory,
the PTO’s public database includes information on whether a
particular patent has been asserted in any lawsuits. That
information, however, is questionable. A recent empirical study
of all 15,000 patent lawsuits filed over four recent years, along
with the 30,000 patents asserted in those lawsuits, determined
that in two-thirds of the cases, the main PTO database failed to
show the lawsuit. A less well-known PTO database related to
freedom of information provides better coverage but still
misses almost one-third of the instances in which lawsuits were
filed.33 Most importantly, studies suggest that the vast majority
of patent demands—perhaps more than 90 percent—never
result in the filing of a lawsuit.34 Thus, the vast majority of
information that might be available to the market remains
hidden away.

32

Id.
Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500 Expanded: Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2014).
34
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S.
INNOVATION (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS
SECRETARY, FACT SHEET: WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON HIGH-TECH
PATENT ISSUES (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patentissues.
33
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B. Why Does Market Information on Patent
Ownership Matter?
In the context of modern monetization, market
information on patent ownership can make an important
contribution to an efficiently functioning patent system. One
can begin with the basic notion that markets function better
when players in the market can identify each other. The ability
to know who hold an asset and how to reach that party is an
essential starting point for any market. This type of information
can avoid the confusion and misinformation that can result in
wasteful transaction costs. To put it simply, shell games and
hide-and-seek rarely make for an efficiently functioning
market.
With patents, moreover, the rights are not onedimensional. Given the potential to separate and distribute
patent rights in various configurations, identifying who is the
“owner” of the right is only the beginning. Depending on the
rights structure established for a particular patent, key
questions could involve who has the right to assert the patent
and who has control to varying extents of assertion of the
patent. In light of the convoluted structures involved,
understanding the money flow also can be an essential part of
understanding who is in control.
Identifying the parties can also provide information
about the territory claimed. The ability to see who controls a
patent and how that patent is being asserted can give notice to
the public of what the patent holders believes is the appropriate
footprint of the patent. That footprint may emerge not simply
in one assertion but through the full body of assertions. In
particular, a patent in one field that is being asserted in another
field puts other players on notice, allowing them to plan and
bargain appropriately.
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Market information also can be helpful in addressing
the bargaining asymmetries reflected in the economics of
modern patent assertion. Although it is certainly not a panacea,
accused infringers may benefit from being able to understand
clearly all of the parties who are involved in the patent, see
others who have been targeted, and see the results of different
assertions that the patent holder (and its entities) have made.
Information on the various parties who have interests in
the patent has efficiency implications for the judicial system as
well. Properly identifying those with relevant interests can
avoid duplicative filings and enhance the potential for an
efficient settlement process. In this context, the court may
benefit from being able to identify all of the relevant parties.
This, of course, would only be useful if the court is able to
bring those parties into the proceedings when appropriate; an
issue that implicates judicial joinder rules. Nevertheless, the
question of whether and when it is appropriate to join must
begin with information on who is in the universe of potential
interests. Such information provides the framework if courts or
regulators wish to hold those with pecuniary interests
responsible for damages that may have been imposed in the
pursuit of their financial interests.
One could argue that the process of eliciting
information on the universe of potential parties will have
judicial efficiency costs. Parties will have to spend time filing
the information with the court, and disputes about the adequacy
of information provided will, inevitably, arise. There are
always costs associated with providing information to the
market, however. The key is finding an appropriate mechanism
to minimize those costs while providing the information
necessary for efficient transactions and settlement. In addition,
such costs are likely to pale in comparison to the current
inefficiencies of the patent litigation system. Shadow boxing is
rarely an efficient judicial sport.
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Finally, market information on the identity of those
who hold interests in patents and the territory they are claiming
with those patents is important from a societal perspective.
With the emergence of the modern market for patent
monetization, it will be essential to develop the type of
oversight that can identify inappropriate behavior when it
occurs and cabin that behavior, as well as identifying patterns
that are likely to lead to market inefficiencies.
Allowing vast networks of hidden behavior has the
happy coincidence of preventing regulatory actors from
observing problematic behavior. From a societal perspective,
the result is less than optimal. Regulatory actors, such as public
and private antitrust actors, as well as securities regulators
where appropriate, must be able to connect the dots that would
reveal a troubling picture.
Such regulatory transparency is particularly important
for patents. Patents are government grants, which are granted
for specific constitutional and legislative goals. When an active
and complex trading market develops for those grants, it is
essential for society to have the ability to determine whether
that market is functioning appropriately and whether it serves
the goals of the system.
C. Following an Established Path
Business environments thrive on stability, and
uncertainty can create friction in the market. Any transition
toward transparency has the potential to create uncertainty for
patent holders, as well as all players in the market. Thus, an
optimal approach to transparency would benefit from an
established set of legal doctrines that create analogies for the
information regime required, as well as an active track record
of success.
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This article suggests that Section 16 of the Securities
Laws provides an excellent framework for the transparency of
beneficial ownership that would so greatly advance the
interests of the patent system. The following section describes
Section 16 and its applicability as a model for the patent
system.

IV.

SECTION 16 AS A MODEL FOR A PATENT DISCLOSURE

¶ 1As the legal system works toward a more powerful and
effective disclosure framework for patent litigation, an
especially fertile source of inspiration can be found in the area
of securities law. A particularly promising starting point is
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the
Securities Act” or “the Act”), which mandates various financial
disclosures by company insiders as part of the Act’s safeguards
against insider trading.35 As mandated by the disclosure
provision contained in Section 16(a), all company directors,
officers, and beneficial owners of more than 10 percent of their
company’s registered equity securities are required to file
detailed reports about their equity holdings in the company.36
The narrow goal of Section 16 is to deter short selling and
profiteering in violation of fiduciary duty. More broadly, the
transparency it mandates is intended to discourage improper
behavior by making all relevant transactions public.
¶ 2Patent litigation could greatly benefit from the
transparency provided by such disclosures, discouraging
improper behavior by forcing parties to operate in the open.37

35

17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2014).
Id.	
  
37
See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 23, at 37–38.
36
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A disclosure requirement based on Section 16 could make it
much easier for defendants to identify the parent entities that
are actually in control of the litigation filed against them,
opening up new avenues for recourse and potentially
discouraging questionable activity altogether. This Section will
examine Section 16 as a model for disclosure reform, first by
providing an overview of the law’s history, then by following
up with a substantive analysis of relevant portions of the law,
and finally by making recommendations tailored to patent
law’s needs.
A. Background on Section 16: Legislative History and
Rationale
Though securities regulation and patent law might seem
like strange bedfellows, they are actually quite similar at a
conceptual level.38 Prohibitions against insider trading and
patent infringement each aim to protect “the economic
incentive to produce socially valuable information.”39 Just as
innovators would lack the incentive to produce new products
without patent protection, investors would not invest in a
particular activity if “the profit from [that] activity is likely to
be diverted” by insider trading.40
An examination of the events that led to Section 16’s
passage and its legislative history paints a picture of a
controversial solution to an equally controversial problem,

38

Michael Risch has even suggested that patent portfolios, such as those
held by patent aggregators, could be treated as securities under
interpretations of current securities law. See Risch, supra note 2.
39
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW &
ECON. 772, 792 (2000).
40
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 577 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
dissenting).	
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resulting in a law that has been revisited and revised several
times since its original passage. Patent law can learn much
from that experience, stepping into the shoes of what is now a
robust, and well-accepted, framework.
The events that led to the passage of Section 16 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were the culmination of more
than two decades’ worth of growing discontent over the impact
of economic policies in the United States.41 In particular, the
Panic of 1907 was a devastating banking crisis, triggered in
large part when a handful of recklessly speculative business
magnates tried and failed to corner the market on United
Copper Company stock.42 Following that crisis, many
Progressives became wary of the manner in which prominent
financiers like J.P. Morgan consolidated their wealth and
influence at the expense of competition.43 In this climate of
suspicion towards the increasing consolidation in the financial
sector, Democratic Congressman Arsene Pujo convened a
series of hearings to determine the extent of the anticompetitive
practices that had taken root.44 The hearings uncovered the

41

See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 7, 76
(2003).
42
ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 38 (2007).
43
Id. at 182. The nature of the current market for monetization, with its
opportunities for conflicts of interest and hidden trading, suggests the
potential for some of the same issues that concerned legislators from this
era. The parties themselves have difficulty keeping track of the web of
relationships. For example, press articles have chronicled one patent auction
in which the Chairman of one entity bidding on the patents was also an
officer of another entity bidding on the same patents. See Roger Parloff,
Taking on the Trolls, FORTUNE (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:54 AM),
http://fortune.com/2014/02/27/rpx-taking-on-the-patent-trolls.
Although
both entities were private, the episode demonstrates the Wild West nature of
this emerging and largely unregulated market.
44
BRUNER & CARR, supra note 42, at 148.
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existence of massive joint accounts known as “pools,” in which
prominent investors working with a broker coordinated the
purchase and sale of large amounts of a particular security in
order to manipulate its price.45
As history would show, these pools contributed to the
1929 stock market crash, which in turn led to the Great
Depression. Section 16 grew from the reform efforts that
targeted these pools during the push for reform after the
crash.46 Although the Pujo Committee shined a spotlight on the
existence of the pools in 1929, it was not until a series of
Senate Banking Committee hearings in 1932 that Congress
uncovered just how great the level of market manipulation had
been in the course of the pools’ operation.47 In what became
known as the Pecora Commission hearings, the Banking
Committee found that the pools had actively manipulated the
public by creating the false impression of demand for particular
securities—even paying financial writers to write favorable
articles about the securities to inflate prices.48 Once pool
members had sufficiently drawn in enough of the public to
drive the price of the security to sky-high levels, members
would unload their shares.49 Revelations of other distasteful
financial practices came to light during the hearings as well,
but the extent of the evidence gathered made it clear that pool

45

Report of the Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429
and 504 to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit,
H.R. REP. NO. 62-1593, at 46 (1913).	
  
46
PETER J. ROMEO & ALAN L. DYE, SECTION 16 TREATISE AND REPORTING
GUIDE 18 (2d ed. 2004).
47
Id. at 17.
48
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 72d and 73d Congs. 445–55 (1932–1934) [hereinafter Stock
Exchange Practices].
49
Id.
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operations were at the “heart of the problem[s]” that had led to
the Crash.50
Following the Pecora Commission hearings, House and
Senate members introduced the bills that would eventually
become the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including
language that would become Section 16.51 Early on, the
Section 16 disclosure requirements were hailed by the section’s
proponents in Congress as one of the bills’ critical components.
The requirement aimed to use transparency to ensure that
company insiders would not act against the interests of other
shareholders. By forcing insiders to publicize certain aspects of
their financial dealings public, the sections strived to ensure
that public scrutiny would force insiders to adhere to their
fiduciary duties.52 Indeed, some observers viewed the
disclosures as sufficient to curb insider trading on their own.53
However, once legislators expanded the scope to
include large shareholders, the disclosure requirements became
the target of harsh criticism from the financial community.
Subjecting directors and officers to the disclosure requirements
was not initially controversial, particularly given the charged
climate following the Pecora hearings.54 In fact, the record
shows that members of Congress considered such a
requirement in line with directors’ and officers’ common law
duty of fiduciary loyalty and fair dealing as owed to their

50

ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 18.
Id. at 23.	
  
52
2 FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, §8.01 (A.A. Sommer,
Jr., ed., 2013).
53
ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 24 (citing Stock Exchange Practices,
supra note 48 (statement of Alfred L. Bemheim, Director of the Securities
Markets Survey of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.)).
54
Id. at 26.
51
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shareholders.55 Section 16 went beyond the traditional view,
however, by applying disclosure requirements to large
shareholders, who unlike officers and directors had not
historically been regarded as having any common law moral or
legal duty to other shareholders of the company.56
Proponents of the provision reconciled the more
expansive approach by arguing that “large shareholders [are]
the equivalent of common law fiduciaries,” given that they are
often in just as much of a position to “influence or control” a
company’s board of directors as the actual directors
themselves.57 Indeed, in some of the worst cases of insider
misconduct uncovered by the Pecora Commission, financiers
often fell into both categories, exercising control both through
official title and through equity ownership. Perhaps the most
notorious was Albert H. Wiggin, Chairman of the Board of
Chase National Bank, whose blatant profiteering through
insider information was so notorious that Section 16 was
commonly called the “anti-Wiggin” provision.58
Another point of contention over shareholder
disclosures was the percentage of ownership required before a
person would be subject to Section 16. Advocates for the
provision initially argued that the threshold should be 5
percent, while those in opposition—chief among them the
financiers who would be subject to the requirement—argued
that it should be as high as 20.59 Although the House and
Senate versions of the bill initially specified 5 percent, the

55

See 78 CONG. REC. 8036–37 (May 3, 1934).
ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 26.
57
Id. at 27.	
  
58
SELIGMAN, supra note 41, at 87.
59
ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 27 (citing Stock Exchange Practices:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 72d and 73d
Congs. 7741–43 (1932–1934)).
56

Vol. 19

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY

No. 01

2

Feldman, Transparency

2014

304

Senate version was amended to 10 percent.60 The Conference
Committee adopted the Senate version, and Section 16 as it
stands today contains a disclosure threshold of 10 percent.61

B. SEC Rulemaking & The Modern Section 16(a)
Disclosure Requirement
Much has changed in the eight decades since passage
of the 1934 Securities Act. In particular, SEC rulemaking has
clarified the requirements of the Act and the definition of those
included under Section 16’s disclosure obligations.
Understanding the modern application of Section 16 is critical
for properly adapting those rules to the patent context.
The key disclosure requirements in Section 16(a) are set
forth in the first paragraph of Rule 16a-2, which specifies the
categories of people who will be considered “insiders” subject
to Section 16:
Any person who is the beneficial owner, directly
or indirectly, of more than ten percent of any
class of equity securities (“ten percent beneficial
owner”) registered pursuant to section 12 of the
Act, any director or officer of the issuer of such
securities, and any person specified in section
30(h) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
including any person specified in § 240.16a-8,
shall be subject to the provisions of section 16
of the Act.62

60

Id.
Id. 	
  
62
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2 (2014).
61
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Essentially, Rule 16a-2 specifies that directors, officers,
and beneficial owners of more than 10 percent of equity
securities in the company must make financial disclosures.63
Although the meaning of “director” has not been the subject of
much controversy, the definition of “officer” as originally
passed was widely seen as overly broad, while “beneficial
owner” was not defined at all.64
To remedy the uncertainty that had developed
surrounding these terms, the SEC in 1991 passed an overhaul
of the Section 16 regulations.65 In a shift that is particularly
relevant for our purposes, the 1991 changes altered the
definitions in a manner that, taken as a whole, creates a wider
variety of ways in which a person or entity can be shown to
have control over a corporation.
1. The Section
Requirement

16

Beneficial

Ownership

The 1991 overhaul created a formal definition for the
category of “beneficial owner.” This category, nevertheless,
continues to have the greatest complexity in practice in part,
because the term “beneficial ownership” has two different
meanings, depending on the stage of analysis. The first
definition of “beneficial ownership” applies at a threshold stage
in which insider status is determined using a narrower
definition found under Section 13(d). At this threshold stage, a
beneficial owner is defined as a person who owns 10 percent or
more of the company’s securities, “directly or indirectly,

63

Id.
ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 58.
65
OWNERSHIP REPORTS AND TRADING BY OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND
PRINCIPAL SECURITY HOLDERS, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34-28869, 48
SEC DOCKET 234 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 SECTION 16 OVERHAUL].	
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through
any
contract,
arrangement,
understanding,
relationship,” and who has voting or investment power over
those securities.66
In keeping with Congress’ intent to apply Section 16
only to those shareholders who can influence or control a
company, the SEC also exempts from the category of
“beneficial ownership” certain people and institutions who own
equity for reasons not related to control or influence.67 These
include brokers, banks, insurance companies, and mutual
funds, among others.68
Beneficial ownership can arise under Section 13(d) in
an anticipatory manner. A person is a beneficial owner of
shares not yet acquired if he or she has the right to acquire
them within sixty days.69 In addition, when two or more people
“agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding,
voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer,” the group
they form is collectively considered a beneficial owner.70
Given that it may be difficult to recognize the creation of a
Section 13(d) group “at the time of the group’s formation,” and
that a group’s existence, as far as statutory requirements are

66

17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3. According to the 1991 SEC release outlining the
Commission’s Section 16 overhaul, the rationale behind the use of the
Section 13(d) definition was to effect Congress’ intent to apply Section 16
to those that can influence or control a company through their equity
ownership. See 1991 SECTION 16 OVERHAUL, supra note 65, at 236. Given
that Section 13(d), like Section 16, was also intended to cover
circumstances in which a party could potentially gain control over a
company through accumulation of equity, the Commission reasoned it was
appropriate to reference the 13(d) definition. ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46,
at 108.
67
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(1).
68
Id.
69
Id. § 240.13d-3(d)(1)(i).
70
Id. § 240.13d-5(b)(1).
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concerned, may be understood after the fact, beneficial
ownership by a group provides perhaps one of the most
common ways to incur liability under Section 16.71
One should note that corporations, partnerships, LLCs,
and other entities also can be beneficial owners under Section
16.72 When a corporate subsidiary is deemed a beneficial
owner of certain securities, each upper-level subsidiary in the
corporate hierarchy is also deemed a beneficial owner, given
that each has the ability to take control of subsidiaries “below it
in the chain.”73
The determination of beneficial ownership, however, is
less cut-and-dried in the case of independently-operated
business units. In 1998, the SEC published an interpretive
position stating that under certain circumstances, shares owned
by independently-operated business units do not have to be
attributed to the parent company for the purpose of determining
beneficial ownership. Relevant factors include whether or not
the business units are truly independent of the parent
company.74
Given the extent to which patent aggregators utilize
corporate structures that obfuscate both the chain of command
and the extent to which their subsidiaries operate
independently, one might be concerned that if Section 16 rules
were adopted in the patent context, aggregators might develop
structures designed to avoid parent reporting responsibilities.
The SEC’s Section 16 analysis, however, adopts from Rule

71

ROMEO & DYE, supra note 46, at 88.	
  
Id. at 122.
73
Id. at 122–23.
74
AMENDMENTS TO BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REPORTING REQUIREMENTS §
II.F.5, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34-39538, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(1998).
72
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13d-3(b) a comprehensive provision preventing such evasive
behavior. The regulation holds that if a party is found to have
created any sort of arrangement designed to avoid beneficial
ownership, the party will be found to have beneficial
ownership nevertheless:
Any person who, directly or indirectly, creates
or uses a trust, proxy, power of attorney,
pooling arrangement or any other contract,
arrangement, or device with the purpose of
effect of divesting such person of beneficial
ownership of a security or preventing the
vesting of such beneficial ownership as part of a
plan or scheme to evade the reporting
requirements of section 13(d) or (g) of the Act
shall be deemed for purposes of such sections to
be the beneficial owner of such security.75
2.

Section 16 and the Notion of “Pecuniary
Interest”

As described above, the term “beneficial ownership”
has two different meanings, depending on the stage of analysis,
with the narrower definition applying at a threshold stage. The
second definition of “beneficial ownership” turns on the
concept of “pecuniary interest,” and this is what governs the
actual disclosures that must be made under Section 16(a).
Specifically, a person or company must disclose any securities
owned for which the person or company is a “beneficial
owner,” defined in Rule 16a-1(a)(2) as “any person who,

75

17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b); see also CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund
Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 292 F.
App’x 133 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 654
F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying the provision).
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directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement,
understanding, relationship or otherwise, has or shares direct or
indirect pecuniary interest in the equity securities.”76 The rule
defines a pecuniary interest generally as the “opportunity,
directly or indirectly, to profit or share in any profit derived
from a transaction in the subject securities.”77 The regulations
contain a “safe harbor” exemption that protects ordinary
shareholders who lack investment or voting control over their
securities from being found to have a pecuniary interest.78
While the rules do not further elaborate on the notion of
a “direct pecuniary interest,” they do go into more detail
regarding the “indirect pecuniary interest” standard, which was
added as part of the SEC’s 1991 clarifying rules and serves to
significantly broaden the range of disclosures required under
Section 16.79 Under the indirect pecuniary interest standard, an
insider would have to file a disclosure if that person has a right
to payment “based on” the profits from another person’s
securities transaction, even if that person has no right to the
actual profits.80
The rules further specify six situations in which an
“indirect pecuniary interest” exists “in any class of equity
securities.” These include shares held by members of a
person’s immediate family that live in the same household; a
general partner’s interest in the shares held by the partnership;
performance-related fees collected by fiduciaries such as
brokers, banks, and insurance companies; separable dividend

76

17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2).
Id. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(i).
78
Id. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(iii).
79
STANTON P. EIGENBRODT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECTION 16:
REPORTING AND COMPLIANCE 2-12 (2003).	
  
80
Id. at 2-13.
77
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rights; certain trust interests; and the right to acquire shares
through a derivative security.81
The rules specify, however, that the list of arrangements
is not exclusive.82 The existence of a pecuniary interest can be
a fact-specific inquiry, and some courts have exercised
significant interpretive discretion in inferring the existence of a
pecuniary interest.83
C. Lessons from Section 16
The statutory requirements for beneficial ownership and
pecuniary interests, combined with SEC guidance and judicial
interpretation of these concepts, reflect the wisdom gained
from years of avoidance techniques. The long and detailed
history surrounding Section 16’s disclosure requirements
provide ample interpretive context regarding how such
requirements operate when challenged by market actors who
may prefer to avoid disclosure. The experience gained through
such a rich legacy would be invaluable when crafting corporate
disclosure requirements in another context.
The notion of stemming avoidance techniques is
particularly important in the context of modern patent
monetization. Patent assertion entities have proven as creative
as the inventors whose patents they purchase—at least from the

81

17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(ii).
Id.
83
See Strauss ex rel. Servico, Inc. v. American Holdings, 902 F. Supp. 475,
481 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that “[w]hile the Court recognizes that the
failure to come within a ‘safe harbor’ does not ipso facto mean that a
defendant is lost at sea, the policies of Section 16 warrant the conclusion
that the complaint sufficiently alleges facts from which an inference of
pecuniary interest in Amhold’s trades might be drawn with respect to
Koether”).	
  
82
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standpoint of legal structuring. As the PTO observed, some use
complicated corporate structures and licenses to hide their
identities from the public.84 Regulatory frameworks that do not
anticipate such creativity are likely to be ineffective. Worse
yet, failure to anticipate such legal creativity could have the
unintended effect of worsening anticompetitive behavior in the
field of patent monetization. Large, sophisticated players may
be able to restructure their portfolios while the new legislation
or regulation conveniently eliminates their smaller, less
sophisticated competition. Such consolidation within any
market would be undesirable, particularly if the government is
an unwitting participant in the process.
D. Adapting Section 16 for a New Patent Litigation
Disclosure Framework
The securities regulation framework could be adapted
comfortably to the patent law context in the following manner.
Section 16’s touchstone is equity securities, with the disclosure
requirements attaching in relation to ownership or interests in
those securities. Applying these concepts to the patent market,
the similar touchstone would be the patent itself, with the
disclosure requirements attaching in relation to ownership,
control, or interests in the patent.
Monetizers organized as limited liability companies
may be tempted to object that the application of doctrines
related to public companies should not be imported to apply to
them. After all, they are not publicly traded entities but remain
private companies or partnerships. The public interest,
however, attaches not to the status of their organization but to
the status of the asset they have the potential to trade. That
asset is imbued with public interest by virtue of the fact that it

84

Proposed Changes, supra note 15, at 4109.
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is a government grant, bestowed only for purposes enshrined in
the Constitution itself. As with the trading of public securities,
the trading of an asset imbued with the public interest must be
sufficiently regulated to ensure proper functioning of that
trading market.
With securities law as a reference, any transparency
requirements for patents should include two key concepts. The
first concept concerns the potential to benefit from assertion of
the patent asset; the second concerns structures designed to
evade the regulatory definitions established.
First, to properly capture the range of ways in which a
party might benefit from assertion of a patent, one would need
a broad definition—and one that is tailored specifically to the
modern patent monetization market. As described above, of
course, assertion of the patent refers not only to filing a lawsuit
but also to making patent demands outside of litigation. Thus,
the category of those who would benefit from assertion of a
patent includes not just those who would receive the proceeds
from a lawsuit settlement, but also those who would receive
proceeds from the patent outside of a lawsuit.
On a basic level, one would ideally want to know where
the money is flowing. This would include securities law
concepts such as “beneficial ownership” and “pecuniary
interest,” including notions related to the “opportunity, directly
or indirectly, to profit or share in any profit derived from a
transaction . . . .”85 On another level, one would want to know
about voting and investment power. Securities law concepts
also may be helpful here as in identifying those who have

85

17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(i).
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voting or investment control over any entity with the ability to
assert the patent.86
On a more subtle level, regulators in particular would
want to be able to identify less formal group behavior. For
example, suppose a group of companies forms a limited
liability company and hires a management company to exploit
a particular patent. One could imagine a large company
providing funding or other support to the patent holding entity,
not to receive any compensation from assertion of the patent
but in order to destabilize a competitor. Moreover, other
support could come in the form of offering database resources
to analyze the patent or identify potential targets, marshaling
legal resources, or other actions.
It is possible that certain securities law concepts might
cover aspects of this issue. Arguably, the notion of profiting
indirectly, which is contained in the language of “opportunity,
directly or indirectly, to profit or share in any profit derived
from a transaction” could cover that circumstance.87 Similarly,
the securities law concept of beneficial ownership contains a
concept of group action, noting specifically that when two or
more people “agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring,
holding, voting or disposing of equity securities of an issuer,”
the group they form is collectively considered a beneficial
owner.88 Nevertheless, given the history of avoidance
structures in patent monetization, any legislative or regulatory

86

Id. § 240.13d-3(a), (d)(1)(i) (specifying that a person is a beneficial
owner either if he or she has voting or investment control over shares
already owned, or if a person is a beneficial owner of shares not yet
acquired if he or she has the right to acquire them within sixty days).	
  
87
Id. § 240.16a-1(a)(2)(i).
88
Id. § 240.13d-5(b)(1).
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regime would benefit from defining the meaning of the term
explicitly and expansively, as well as offering examples.
The potential for avoidance leads to the second concept
that would be essential for any patent transparency regime. The
disclosure language must encompass, and indeed anticipate,
attempts to develop structures that will slide between the
examples and definitional language provided. One would want
to adopt a regime loosely analogous to the step transaction
doctrine in tax law, in which regulators collapse the steps of a
transaction when it is structured for avoidance.89 Once again,
the securities law language includes within the definition of
beneficial owner those who directly or indirectly create devices
to evade reporting requirements.90
Finally, securities law contains an exemption from
reporting requirements for certain categories of people and
institutions, such as brokers, banks, insurance companies, and
mutual funds. These are exempted on the grounds that they
own equity for reasons not related to control or influence.91
Given the structure of certain aggregators and the temptations
for avoidance, one would want to draft any such exemption
with extreme care. For example, some patent aggregators are

89

See Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, supra note 7, at 310
(suggesting analogies to the step transaction doctrine as part of a proposal
for a judicial doctrine of inappropriate use of intellectual property).
90
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(b) (specifying that “[a]ny person who, directly or
indirectly, creates or uses a trust, proxy, power of attorney, pooling
arrangement or any other contract, arrangement, or device with the purpose
or effect of divesting such person of beneficial ownership of a security or
preventing the vesting of such beneficial ownership as part of a plan or
scheme to evade the reporting requirements of section 13(d) or (g) of the
Act shall be deemed for purposes of such sections to be the beneficial
owner of such security”).	
  
91
Id. § 240.16a-1(a)(1).
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organized as investment funds, and one would not want to
allow the definition of mutual fund to expand to exempt these
entities from transparency requirements.
Timing of the disclosure obligation will be important
both for market players and for patent holders themselves. Too
frequent disclosure over-burdens the patent holder while
infrequent disclosure leaves market players in the dark and
allows game-playing. As described below in Section E, the
PTO has, at times, proposed disclosure requirements in
conjunction with maintenance fees and post-grant proceedings.
Section E will discuss why such timing is insufficient for
adequate disclosure.
An effective transparency regime could require
disclosure at several points in the life of a patent. These could
include critical moments—such as the patent application, the
patent grant, transfer of ownership, maintenance fees, lawsuits,
and post-grant review, in addition to update requirements on an
annual or sufficiently frequents basis. For those who are
concerned that individual patent owners will be hurt by their
inability to follow transparency requirements, the system could
provide mitigation opportunities for small players, for example,
allowing small players to cure a defect upon request. When
small players trade with large players, however, obligations on
the large players would prevent the creation of loopholes that
sophisticated players could exploit. No disclosure system could
eliminate all opportunities for strategic behavior, but a wellcrafted regime that relies on the history of corporate securities
disclosure could provide for a more efficient and smoothly
functioning patent market.
E. Comparative Proposals
As concerns have mounted over the lack of information
about patent ownership and control, members of Congress and
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the PTO have floated various proposals.92 Any transparency
would be an improvement over the status quo, and even a small
amount of sunshine would be a welcome relief. Thus, even the
narrowest of proposals has merit, although some approaches
have greater potential for bringing forth significant
information. Nevertheless, these proposals would not
necessarily result in a level of transparency commensurate with
the full information necessary for rational patent behavior and
an optimally functioning market.
Looking first at the PTO proposals, in 2012, the PTO
published proposed requirements for recordation of “real-partyin-interest information” when a patent is pending and during
the patent term.93 In addition to the benefits of more effective
market clearing, the PTO notice cited the importance of aiding
the agency in its operations by ensuring that any proceedings
are authorized by the prior owner and ensuring that the PTO’s
own officials would know when to recuse themselves. Other

92

As of publication of this article, the PTO’s Deputy Director has indicated
that the Office is not planning to act on those proposals, deferring instead to
Congress to address the issue. See Ryan Davis, USPTO Backs Away from
Patent Transparency Rules, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2014, 4:48 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/590197/uspto-backs-away-from-patenttransparency-rules (speech by USPTO Deputy Director Michelle Lee). For
an interesting discussion of potential statutory authority for the Patent &
Trademark Office to promulgate transparency requirements, and limits on
that authority absent congressional action, see Dennis Crouch, Whither the
USPTOs Authority to Require Ownership Recordation, PATENTLY-O (Feb.
10,
2014),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/02/authority-ownershiprecordation.html.
93
Notice of Roundtable on Proposed Requirements for Recordation of RealParty-in-Interest Information Throughout Application Pendency and Patent
Term, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,385 [hereinafter USPTO Proposed Rules] (proposed
Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 3).
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concerns included resolving prior art issues and properly
initiating third-party proceedings.94
The PTO proposed two alternative definitions of realparty-in-interest, both of which were offered for public
commentary. The first definition was “necessary and sufficient
to bring a legal infringement action.” The second definition
was “the ultimate parent entity,” which was further defined as
“an entity which is not controlled by any other entity.”
Both definitions for real-party-in-interest reference
legal doctrines that would be far too narrow to ensure
transparency. The first concept, as well as the actual term “realparty-in-interest” itself, references the disclosure required in
some jurisdictions that would allow judges to decide whether
they must recuse themselves from a case.95 Such conflicts of
interest typically arise if the judge has an investment in a
company with a direct interest in the proceeding.96 It is this
requirement that eventually revealed the names of those who
had invested in certain funds organized by the mass aggregator,
Intellectual Ventures in the Xilinx case.
The real-party-in-interest concept, however, applies in
drastically limited circumstances. For example, although realparty-in-interest may reveal investors, those who invest in a
fund may not be the same as those who control the decision
making for the entity running the fund or related entities. Nor
does real-party-in-interest information communicate the
relationships among various shell companies and entities,

94

See id. at 70387.
For a short discussion of the rules in various federal and state
jurisdictions related to revealing interested parties for the purposes of
judicial recusal, see Ewing & Feldman, supra note 23, at text accompanying
notes 200–20.
96
USPTO Proposed Rules, supra note 93, at 70,386.	
  
95
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disclosure that would be necessary for providing full market
information.
From this perspective, the Xilinx case itself is
instructive. Knowing the names of the investors in the
aggregator’s fund did not help Xilinx determine which shell
companies were the proper ones to include in the lawsuit
challenging the validity of the patent.97
The second definition regarding ultimate parent entity
specifically references the antitrust laws regarding mergers and
acquisitions. In particular, the PTO references sections related
to what is known as the “Hart-Scott-Rodino” threshold, which
designates the point at which one must file with the Federal
Trade Commission for antitrust clearance of a merger or
acquisition.
Although casting a broader net than judicial recusal,
the Hart-Scott-Rodino sieve is aimed at capturing large players.
Information sufficient for an optimally functioning patent
market, however, would be necessary for a patent regardless of
whether the patent holder is a large or small player. In addition,
even where anticompetitive behavior is concerned, the HartScott-Rodino threshold may be ineffective in the complex
patent monetization world. One can see the limitations of the
traditional antitrust thresholds for modern patent monetization
both in theory and in practice.
From a theoretical perspective, this author has written
extensively about the way in which current antitrust doctrines
might fall short in failing to measure potential rent-seeking

97

See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 23, at text accompanying notes 211–
19.
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behavior in the market for patent monetization.98 Behavior in
which patent holders pursue returns above the economic value
of their patents can have a significant impact on consumer
prices and consumer welfare.99 Most important, in the context
of the economics of patent litigation and modern monetization
techniques, smaller groupings can have impact within a
product market.
The concern, however, is more than theoretical. This
author chronicled the rise of one product company that
purchased a set of broadly worded patents and asserted them
aggressively against competitors, as well as engaging in an
expansive acquisition campaign of buying more than twenty
competitors and patent portfolios in the field. None of the
individual transactions, however, appears to have triggered the
Hart-Scott-Rodino reporting requirements.100 The point is
simply that antitrust thresholds are unlikely to be sensitive
enough to serve as the appropriate analogy for patent
transparency regulations.101
After more than a year of public commentary, the PTO
published a revised set of proposals for comments. Published in

98

See Feldman, supra note 7, at 303–05 (explaining, among other issues,
that the market for patent monetization must be understood as a market
itself, and the potential for	
   competitors	
   to	
   collude	
   within	
   that market or to
use combination mechanisms in that market to stamp out next-generation
substitutes for current products).
99
Id. at 304.
100
For a detailed description, see id.at 288–94.	
  
101
In the antitrust context, European Union rules for determining whether a
transfer of control has occurred are more sensitive. The test considers
whether a party has achieved “the possibility to exercise decisive influence”
over an undertaking. See, e.g., Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional
Notice Under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings, C 95 OFFICIAL J. OF THE E.U. 1, 8
(2008).
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January of 2014, the new proposals move away from the notion
of “real-party-in-interest” replacing that concept with a
requirement to disclose who actually holds the title to the
patent, as well as reporting what is termed enforcement
entities, ultimate parent entities, and hidden beneficial owners.
The 2014 proposals were a stronger effort to strike at the heart
of the patent transparency problems.
Enforcement entities are described as those necessary to
be joined in a lawsuit to have standing to enforce a patent. The
rule would require disclosure of exclusive licensees in some
cases. Ultimate parent entities are defined, once again, in
reference to the Hart-Scott-Rodino regulatory requirements—
the limitations of which are discussed above. Hidden beneficial
owners are described as those who try to avoid the need for
disclosure by temporarily divesting themselves of ownership
rights through contractual or other arrangements.
The concept of casting the net widely to include those
who are trying to hide is an important one in patent
monetization. Looking only for those who temporarily divest,
however, could risk missing a considerable amount of evasive
behavior. Complex patent aggregation and monetization
entities may be permanently designed to avoid transparency,
neatly bypassing requirements related to temporary divestment.
The hidden beneficial owners section does explain that the
section is “designed to discourage intentional shielding of such
ownership interests,” language that could conceivably apply
more broadly than temporary structures. Following on the heels
of the “temporary divestment” language, however, the broader
language could have significant difficulty standing on its own.
Calibrating the notion of hidden beneficial owners will
be critical to transparency. For example, National Public Radio
has reported on the shell company “Oasis Research,” noting
that the company distributes 90 percent of its net profits to
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Intellectual Ventures. At a panel at Stanford Law School, one
of the founders of Intellectual Ventures suggested that
Intellectual Ventures always sues in its own name. When asked
about the lawsuits filed by Oasis Research, the Intellectual
Ventures founder responded that Intellectual Ventures has
simply sold the assets to, and does not control, Oasis
Research.102 This perspective is an example of how entities
have already structured their relationships with shell companies
to obtain the financial benefits, while maintaining sufficient
distance to try to avoid disclosure obligations that might be
imposed in the future.
The timing requirements of the PTO 2014 proposal are
seriously limited as well. Patent applicants are required to
provide information at the time of filing for a patent and have
an ongoing obligation to update information while the patent is
pending. Once the patent issues, however, the patent holder is
only required to update information when maintenance fees are
due and at the time of any post-issuance proceedings before the
PTO. Maintenance fees are due only three times in the twentyyear life of a patent, at three years, seven years, and eleven
years.103
The advantage of limiting transparency requirements to
these few moments lies in the lower production burden on
patent-holders. Modern patent monetization takes place
throughout the life of the patent, however, and occasional
information does not provide the robust information necessary
for an openly functioning market.

102

Peter Detkin, Founder, Intellectual Ventures, Panel Discussion II at the
Stanford Law School Conference on Patent Trolls and Patent Reform (Mar.
21, 2014) (author on panel).
103
See Maintain Your Patent, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/maintain.jsp.
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Various legislative proposals have been introduced at
various times in Congress as well. These have generally
focused on transparency during litigation. As described above,
only a small percentage of patent demands ever reach the
courthouse. Thus, although such transparency proposals are an
important improvement over the status quo, their reach is
limited. In addition, the Congressional proposals focus on
disclosing those who have a direct financial interest in the
patent at issue in the litigation, including the right to any part
of the award. These proposals would benefit from reference to
the securities law concepts described above, particularly in
expanded form.
In short, even if the Section 16 framework is not
adopted whole cloth, reference to the concepts of Section 16
may be helpful for ensuring transparency of market
information in patents. Thus, the more limited proposals
described above can themselves benefit from reference to those
concepts, either at the time of passage by legislative and
regulatory bodies or at the time of judicial interpretation.
Referencing the securities regulation framework for terms such
as beneficial and pecuniary interest and the avoidance language
brings the wisdom of experience gained with the use of those
terms across time.

V.

CONCLUSION

The patent system has evolved dramatically in recent
years, with the development of an active trading market for
patents and the creation of complex and multi-layered
structures for patent ownership. These developments impede
the flow of market information that can allow participants to
understand even basic issues, such as patent ownership. Such
fundamental information is essential for ensuring a properly
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functioning patent market, one that is as efficient as possible in
its pursuit of the constitutional and legislative goals.
In choosing a method for providing such information
to the market, however, one need not write on a blank slate.
The provisions of the securities laws that relate to disclosure of
ownership interests, particularly Section 16, provide a useful
framework that could be adapted to the disclosure needs of the
patent regime. As with the trading of public securities, the
trading of an asset imbued with the public interest must be
sufficiently regulated to ensure proper functioning of that
trading market, particularly when the type of asset is so
essential for companies throughout the economy.
The value of the Section 16 disclosure provisions lies in
their ability to reach both strategic and financial lines. Creating
market transparency for patents will require both of these
elements, in light of the complexity of modern patent
monetization.
The Section 16 approach also has the advantage of
providing a robust body of interpretative case law. With more
than twenty years of interpretation of terms such as “beneficial
ownership” and “pecuniary interest,” the securities regulatory
framework can mitigate the uncertainty that may accompany
any new regulatory regime. Although certainly not perfect, the
number of issues explored and clarified would provide a head
start for an analogous disclosure regime.
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